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1
INTRODCUTION
Thanks to Fredric Jameson’s essay “Third World Literature in the Era of
Multinational Capitalism,” the concept of the postmodern national allegory made its way
into the collective consciousness of academia. In this piece, which was roundly criticized
upon its publication in 1986, Jameson—a political theorist and literary critic—proposes a
rather controversial model by which we might interpret so-called third world literature.
He argues that “all third world texts are necessarily [...] allegorical” (13); but not
allegorical in the sense that one object stands in for another in a “one-to-one table of
equivalencies.” Rather, Jameson describes allegory as a complex and discontinuous
“signifying process” (73), within which an object may hold multiple, or perhaps even
ambiguous meanings. Although Jameson did not invent the term, his particular usage
succeeded in prompting an intense debate concerning the intersection of literature and
global politics.
But we could—and should—ask, what makes third world literature different from
“first world” literature? Jameson goes on to explain that in the capitalist West, there is a
distinct separation between art (or literature) in the private sphere, and politics in the
public sphere. He writes, “[We have a] deep cultural conviction that the lived experience
of our private existences is somehow incommensurable with the abstractions of economic
[and political] science [...]” (69). Due to the systematic oppression of the third world
through centuries of Western imperialism and colonialism, the nations of the third world
have no such luxury. For these people, personal and political narratives are “necessarily”
linked. Understandably, many readers criticized Jameson’s use of the term “third
world,” which first emerged during the Cold War to denote foreign powers unaligned
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with either the West or the Soviet bloc. In recent years, however, it has been used to
refer to poorer (often economically exploited) non-Western countries. Early in the essay,
Jameson readily acknowledges the problematic nature of the term “third world,” but
argues that despite the great cultural and socio-historical diversity in non-Western
countries, “[there is no] comparable expression that articulates [...] the break between the
capitalist first world [...] and a range of other countries which have suffered the
experience of colonialism and imperialism” (67). In the West, Jameson explains, we
have the ability to live our lives free of such a history of oppression. Our experiences
throughout life—unlike those of third world nations—have not been shaped by the ways
in which we have struggled to get out from under the influence of a foreign power.
Jameson writes,
“[Our] view from the top is epistemologically crippling, and reduces its subjects
to the illusions of a host of fragmented subjectivities, to the poverty of the
individual experience of isolated monads, to dying individual bodies without
collective pasts or futures bereft of any possibility of grasping the social totality.
This placeless individuality, this structural idealism which affords us the luxury
of the Sartrean blink, offers a welcome escape from the “nightmare of history”,
but at the same time it condemns our culture to psychologisms and the
“projections” of fragmented subjectivity” (22).
All of this, he claims, is off limits to the third world, which must be “situational
and materialist despite itself.” Needless to say, his admittedly sweeping claims made
many people quite angry. Among Jameson’s detractors is Aijaz Ahmad, whose criticism
of Jameson rests on the idea that he succeeded in exploring the West rather than the
“Other,” and in doing so, engaged in “patronizing, theoretical orientalism” (Szeman 803).
But Imre Szeman, in defense of Jameson, attempts to clarify the point: “[the broader aim
of “Third World Literature in an Era of Multinational Capitalism” is to] develop a system
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by which it might be possible to consider these texts within the global economic and
political system that produces the third world as the third world” (807). Of course, I am
not here to say whether or not Jameson should be the definitive voice in the discussion of
third world literature. I think that there are aspects of his argument that require deeper
conversation on the topic of national allegory, and unfortunately, this is not the place for
that. Rather, I seek to use his paradigm of national allegory in order to discuss a
particular national cinema—in this case, that of China.
I first became interested in the subject during my junior year, during a course
on World (or non-Western) cinema. We studied Wong Kar-wai’s Chungking Express
(1994), and I remember feeling as if a whole new landscape of film had been opened up
to me. I think I realized then just how ethno and euro-centric my film education had
been, up to that point. I know that I cannot possibly do the subject justice—not entirely.
But I had to start somewhere, and Jameson seemed like as good a place as any. We share
a similar goal: to elaborate on a system by which we can begin to understand certain
aspects of non-Western literature—or in this case, film. I know that Chinese cinema is
not one whole—the movements and stories it contains are as heterogeneous as the ethnic
groups within China itself. In order to give myself a broader perspective of how the
concept of national allegory applies to Chinese film, I have decided to separate my
inquiry around films that were produced within three distinct political contexts: the
People’s Republic of China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. While they all share a national
identity, the ways in which this identity is expressed are very different. For example,
due to various historical events throughout the past few centuries, the people of Hong
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Kong may not have the same idea of what it means to be Chinese as do the people of
Taiwan.
Here, it might be useful to point to the concept of the “imagined community”—a
phrase coined by Benedict Anderson in 1983. He believed that nations are essentially
communities that are held together by a psychological construction of camaraderie, rather
than a concrete political power (Anderson 5-7). Szeman similarly proposes that the
cultural specificities of the nation-state lie in the space between the “psychological and
the political” (810). Anderson posits that in countries affected by colonialism,
nationalism paves a path toward the reconstruction of an identity independent of the
powers that be. Szeman describes the same re-shaping of any one culture as a “cultural
revolution.” In particular, China’s search for a national identity would take the country
through a series of sociopolitical upheavals (including the aptly named “Cultural
Revolution”) throughout the 20th and 21st centuries. At the forefront of numerous
conflicts were the Kuomintang (or KMT)—the nationalist party—and the Communist
Party of China (CPC), which fought for control throughout the Japanese occupation
(1931-1945). Eventually, however, after the fall of the Japanese empire, the CPC (under
the management of Mao Zedong) managed to take control of most of the mainland. The
defeated KMT fled to Taiwan, where the Japanese had surrendered to the nationalists.
However, China would continue to face questionable leadership under Mao, and the
people’s discontent with a brutal communist regime continued to boil under the surface
until peaceful protesters were forcefully driven out of Tiananmen Square on June 4th,
1989. At that point, the People’s Republic came under great international scrutiny,
although the sanctions placed upon the nation in the early 90’s were later lifted without
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fanfare. The people of China, however, continued to come face to face with a changing
global landscape. In 1991, military rule came to an end in Taiwan, and the KMT were
officially ousted from office in 2000. In 1997, Hong Kong—which had previously been
under British control—was returned to the PRC.
Of course, this is only a rough outline of a complex and fraught history of China’s
entering the 21st century. But I shall soon attempt to navigate events which have had a
significant impact on Chinese filmmakers—events which, arguably, inform the narratives
of their films. Directors like Jia Zhangke (of the PRC), Hou Hsiao-Hsien (Taiwan), and
Wong Kar-wai (Hong Kong) have all utilized various stylistic methods of incorporating
the political and social climate of China into their art. It will be my goal throughout the
three chapters of this thesis to highlight the historical events which are being represented
allegorically in each film (one for each director), how the narrative of the film reflects
these events, and how each director’s specific style supports the latter. In addition, I
seek to develop a greater understanding of how these distinct political contexts (Hong
Kong, Taiwan, and the PRC) create the narrative of China as a whole. Here, in
chronological order, is a brief introduction to each of the films I will study:
Firstly, Hou Hsiao-Hsien’s A City of Sadness (1989) portrays one family’s violent
history during the White Terror in Taiwan—a period of marital law on the island that
lasted for nearly 40 years. But the film deals mainly with the experience of people on
the periphery of this larger historical event. For example, the unlucky Lin family feels
the repercussions of Taiwan’s political upheaval, even though they aren’t anywhere near
the epicenter of Taipei. In the film, gangsters from Shanghai begin to take control of
business on the island, and violence and deceit start to creep into the family’s
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comfortable lifestyle. At the center of the narrative is the youngest of three brothers:
Wen-ching, a deaf-mute photographer who catalogues the family’s experiences through
his camera lens. In many ways, his inability to communicate through traditional
structures reflects the silence that fell upon Taiwan during the 1940’s—a silence marked
by a ban against the Taiwanese dialect, and the suppression of any perceived movement
against the KMT’s rule (Reynaud 31). Another central character—who also provides the
voiceover narration for most of the movie—is a young woman named Hinomi. She is not
only at the periphery of the larger events happening on the island, but she is also at the
periphery of the family. While the men do business and discuss politics, the women are
often confined to the kitchen, or told to keep their mouths shut. Wen-ching and Hinomi
together make a couple that is on the fringes of both family and society.
In Chungking Express (1994), Wong Kar-wai presents us with characters who
seem to have lost their way. His protagonists drift through the so-called “Chungking
jungle” of Hong Kong, counting down the minutes, hours, and days until they find true
love. Cop 223 buys cans of pineapple marked with a May 1st, 1994 expiration date (the
one month anniversary of his lover’s departure), and when his ex-girlfriend May refuses
to get back together, he desperately attempts to reconnect with women from his past.
Meanwhile, a young woman called Faye struggles to get the attention of her melancholic
love interest—Cop 663. Despite there being no direct reference to the looming handover
of Hong Kong, Chungking Express was released shortly before that date, and it is
difficult to notice the ticking clocks and ominous expiration dates without recognizing the
parallel. The characters in the film are desperate to make a connection with each other in
a dizzyingly crowded world, and their own anxiety reflects the anxiety surrounding Hong
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Kong’s uncertain future. It seems as though the city itself is on display here—with all of
its rich diversity and unique spirit. It’s as if Wong wants us to see what might be lost in
the coming months. Despite his love for the city, however, there is a distinct element of
melancholy in the film—at night, the images of Hong Kong take on an uneasy, dreamlike
quality. Wong consistently reminds us that time is passing, and that the people we love
aren’t sticking around.
Finally, in his movies about everyday working class people, Jia Zhangke
consistently draws attention to the disconnect between a socialist past and a increasingly
globalized, capitalist future. His characters often speak of their youth during Mao’s
Cultural Revolution with a strange sort of melancholic longing. In A Touch of Sin (Jia
Zhangke, 2013), however, characters express more than a touch of discontent with
China’s current economic woes. In the first segment of the film, the disparity between
the wealthiest socialites and the poorest workers becomes painfully apparent when one
man called Dahai takes it upon himself to rid the world of corrupt village officials. The
film, which is broken up into four distinct segments, is a bleak look at what China has
become—for women, for the poor, and for the oppressed. Therefore, it retains little of
the peaceful recollection of the past that defined Jia’s 24 City (2008). The world in A
Touch of Sin is a world in limbo: disorientation and confusion often temper the anger in
Jia’s characters, so they wander across the country, lost and indecisive. In this manner,
he highlights the struggles of ordinary people who are merely trying to adapt to a way of
life that is very different from what they once knew. Jia himself admits that most of the
stories in A Touch of Sin—such as the suicide of a young factory worker and the murder
of one cruel brothel patron—are based on real events that took place in different parts of
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the country (Adams). Throughout the film, Jia seems to asks us, where does this
violence come from, and whose fault is it? The poor girl seeking honest work, or the rich
men who beat and humiliate her?
Overall, I hope to explore how these events and moments in history have shaped
the experiences of the Chinese people, and how different filmmakers have asked the
question of what it means to be Chinese. As for Jameson, I do not seek to disprove nor
to defend his position on third world literature. For example, one of the critiques of his
work centers around the fact that he was merely “using the third world as a lens by which
to examine the West” (Szeman 803). I think that criticism is valid, and I hope that I can
go beyond Jameson’s model—not by indulging in my knowledge of Chinese culture (it is
limited by my overwhelming Americanness), but by admitting that I do not know if
Jameson’s claim holds true. I can only hope to elaborate upon the politics that have
shaped the relationship between Western and non-Western cultures, and how they inform
the art that we both make. And I do not mean for this disclaimer to be self-serving or
patronizing in any way—but if I am presumptuous, I welcome criticism, and it is my
greatest desire to break free of my inherent ethnocentricity.
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CHAPTER I:
A City of Sadness
It is difficult to begin a conversation of Hou Hsiao-Hsien’s award-winning A City
of Sadness (1989) without first acknowledging the climate of the times in which it came
to be. According to Berenice Reynaud, Hou was working on editing the film during the
summer of 1989, when the protests in Tiananmen Square were reaching a head (Reynaud
8). After the student protesters were forcibly driven out of the square on June 4th, Hou
reportedly recognized the parallels between the situation in his film and the turmoil of
China’s modern sociopolitical landscape. He wondered, “why do such tragedies keep
befalling the Chinese people?” (Reynaud 9), and hoped that A City would prompt his
audience to feel a sense of anger at those responsible for such violence. In addition, A
City of Sadness, which picked up a Golden Lion at the Venice Film Festival in 1989,
garnered international acclaim for the way in which it drew attention to Chinese
filmmakers and the artistic merit of their work.
But in the wake of the Tiananmen Square protests, which focused on securing
various freedoms (such as the end of censorship) and political reforms, the film also
served to illuminate the open wounds of contemporary Chinese culture. When A City
was released, it came only two years after the end of military rule in Taiwan, and
prompted both “national pride” and the suspicion of Taiwanese officials (Reynaud 8).
The events in the film—which outlines the history of the fictional Lin family during the
White Terror—felt all too familiar, considering the climate of Mao’s despotic rule of the
PRC, as well as apprehension surrounding the future of the newly democratized
government in Taiwan. Even though the immediate events of the film have long since
come to a close, the political discourse that Hou presents within the narrative remains
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entirely relevant today, as it did in 1989. But in order to understand the significance of
the film’s reception in Taiwan, one must first understand the significance of the historical
events it portrays. In short, the movie portrays various events leading up to the White
Terror. Specifically, it tells the stories of the Lin family’s three brothers; each of which
experience various hardships throughout the years. The oldest son, Wen-heung, as well as
the third son (Wen-leung), become embroiled with gangsters from Shanghai after the
Japanese flee the island. Eventually, however, Wen-leung’s deal with the mainlanders
goes bad, and the brothers are labeled as Japanese sympathizers—a death sentence
(Reynaud 25). In the meantime, the youngest son (Wen-ching) attempts to escape the
turmoil by running to the mountains with his radical socialist friends. The film also
follows a young woman named Hinomi, who falls in love with Wen-ching as she
attempts to adapt to this rapid succession of changes. Eventually, however, all but
Hinomi and the Lin patriarch fall victim to the violence between the Taiwanese and the
mainlanders. Overall, the smaller events of the narrative help to illuminate the larger
events taking place throughout China; in this case, the Lin’s personal hardships were
shared by countless people across Taiwan. This is how A City works as an allegory:
actions on the small scale stand in for shared, national experiences which have previously
been suppressed by government of Taiwan. In order to understand the allegory, we must
read through this coded, fictional story.
While the incidents in the film often occur out of order or in a series of
flashbacks, A City’s opening minutes portray a critical cultural and political shift. The
movie starts with the Japanese emperor Hirohito’s speech announcing his surrender to the
Allied forces. It plays over the credits until the first sequence of the film begins: the
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eldest brother of the Lin family, Wen-heung, is tinkering with the lights as his wife
prepares to give birth in the background. It is a scene that is both grimy and realistic in
its depiction of motherhood, as well as highly symbolic. Over her plaintive cries, we can
hear Hirohito’s speech—now fuzzy through the static of the radio. As the woman
screams, however, Hirohito’s voice is drowned out by the noise of the birth. Finally,
when the baby is born, the speech—which is delivered in a traditional Japanese dialect—
fades out entirely, and is replaced by a sweeping, non-diegetic musical score (Reynaud
10-11). Here, the birth of the Taiwanese child ushers in a new chapter of history, and his
pathetic wailing eclipses the speech of the once-mythical emperor. With the end of the
war, Japan’s influence over the island was effectively lost, and a struggle between the
PCP and the KMT would soon fill the resulting vacuum.
The departure of the Japanese forces is also represented through the character of
Shizuko, with whom Hinomi is close friends. Shizuko, upon the eve of her leaving
Taiwan, gives Hinomi a sword (which she is to pass on to Shizuko’s lover, Hinomi’s
brother Hinoe) and a kimono. With that, she is gone, so Hinomi begins to spend more
and more time with Hinoe and his radical intellectual friends (also, keep in mind that the
Tiananmen Square protests were essentially run by students and intellectuals as well).
But throughout the film, we also learn that the Japanese influence in the culture of
Taiwan is not entirely lost—it is, in turn, a part of the Taiwanese people’s complex
national identity. Later, Taiwanese men who are condemned to death by the mainland
Nationalists will sing in Japanese—expressing a facet of their identity that the KMT had
desperately hoped to suppress.
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In this manner, throughout the film, the events taking place on the island are
indicative of a cultural shift from rule under the Japanese to rule under the escaped
mainland Nationalists. A rich part of Taiwanese culture—with all of its Japanese and
native influence—would be suppressed by the KMT, who sought to use Taiwan as an
outpost in their fight to win back the mainland from Mao’s forces. Unfortunately, the
takeover would prove to pose a very serious risk to the freedom of Taiwanese families.
For example, when gangsters from Shanghai develop a sour working relationship with
Wen-leung, he and his brothers are denounced as Japanese sympathizers and arrested.
The balance of power in Taiwan has been disrupted, and the hapless Lin family are left
out in the cold. While they are eventually able to strike a deal with the mainlanders, it is
too late for Wen-leung, who has been tortured into a shell of his former self. For the
members of the Lin family, imprisonment, torture, and execution are very real threats.
On the eve of the 2-28 Incident, which saw countless civilians murdered for challenging
the KMT government, Wen-ching (who is deaf and mute) is arrested for fraternizing with
Hinoe (essentially a member of the Taiwanese resistance) and company. In jail, Wenching can only make sense of what is going on around him through the body language of
the other inmates (Reynaud 34). His silence—and his inability to communicate with the
men who have captured him—only reflects the inability of the Taiwanese to resist—and
even to communicate— with the KMT (Reynaud). In reality, Tony Leung (Wen-ching)
simply couldn’t speak the Taiwanese dialect, so Hou had to make up a way to keep him
in the film. But Hou also utilizes Wen-ching and his penchant for photography as a
witness of sorts—“capable of extracting emotions, narrative, and spirituality from
lighting and framing his subjects” (Reynaud 34).
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The character of Wen-ching is therefore indicative of one of the film’s overall
goals—to finally tell the story of what happened to Taiwan during the years of the
takeover. For decades, the subject was considered entirely taboo, and to speak of events
like the 2-28 Incident (a day of unprecedented violence) was essentially forbidden. But
with the repeal of martial law in 1987, things began to change, and following the release
of A City of Sadness in 1989, people found that they could revisit the traumas of the past
without fearing for their safety. Here, in a movie, were characters speaking in native
Taiwanese dialect (which had previously been banned in official settings). The “family
drama” genre was familiar to audiences at the time, but this certainly wasn’t your run-ofthe-mill melodrama. The ramifications of A City were great—it broke records at the box
office, and finally the Taiwanese people felt that they could speak more openly about
what had happened to them and their families. According to Jean Ma in Melancholy
Drift, “A City of Sadness made an enormous impact on Taiwan’s cultural scene as the
first major film to revisit the historical trauma of the immediate aftermath of World War
II [...]” (20). In fact, the marketing of the film relied on the tagline, “a story you could
not hear, and could not discuss...before today” (Ma 21).
However, much of the action of the film takes place on the periphery of these
larger historical events. What is important to Hou is not necessarily the individual caught
up in the traumatic moment, but rather how the collective trauma bleeds through the
fabric of family life and society as a whole. Hou tends to focus on the context of the
action—how characters interact with other characters, and how the state of the family
takes precedence over that of the individual. But how exactly does Hou set out to
accomplish this delicate re-telling of history within the confines of a 3-hour film? In
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other words, how does he utilize the medium of film in order to connect with his intended
audience? A City of Sadness—with its political and social nuance, as well as artistic
merit—is considered a masterpiece by many scholars of Chinese cinema. And the film is
breathtaking—it’s long, but it’s beautiful. In Staging Memories by Abe Mark Nornes
and Emilie Yueh-yu Yeh, the authors propose that Hou uses some distinct filmmaking
techniques which are key in understanding the effect of the film altogether. Amongst
them are minimal camera movement, long takes and long shots, repetition, and the
“gradual revelation and construction of spatial relationships” (Nornes & Yueh-yu Yeh).
Similarly, Berenice Reynaud describes Hou’s style thusly: “Through his minimalist
imagery, complex framing, elliptic rendering of interpersonal relationships, and [...]
disruptions created by his storytelling technique [...], Hou involves the spectator
emotionally, while leaving [them] intellectually responsible for constructing the multiple
layers of the plot” (9).
The three authors mentioned above have proposed similar models of Hou’s
distinct film style, which I will attempt to explicate and condense within the next few
pages. First of all, Hou’s narrative is distinctly nonlinear, and we are often left to infer
the passing of time. According to Jean Ma, there are numerous flashbacks in Hou’s films
that actually “[undermine] the stability of the present tense as a narrative anchor [...] and
displace the present as the narrative’s main locus of enunciation [...]” (30). The example
that Ma employs is the scene in which Shizuko gives her gifts to Hinomi. There is a
flashback which apparently belongs to Shizuko, in which she sings for a class of children,
and then one in which she is wearing the kimono she gives to Hinomi. But the next
sequence (which takes place after the initial gift-giving) is no longer hinged on Shizuko’s
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point of view. She is nowhere in the scene; rather, Hou shows us Hinomi pouring over
papers with Wen-ching and Hinoe. Ma wonders, “whose recollections motivate the
flashbacks here?” (39). Despite Shizuko singing a song which links her memory to the
present moment in the narrative, she essentially disappears from our view, and her song is
resumed by a different, non-diegetic source. Here, Hou reveals his penchant for playing
with the “parameters [...] of subjectivity” (40) and collective memory. In other words, it
is not Shizuko, Hinoe, or Hinomi who prompt the flashbacks, but rather, the significance
of their relationships to each other.

Here, Hou highlights the importance of the

collective experience over that of the individual. Overall, in A City, the family unit is
what suffers the most.
Along the same lines, Hou also enjoys inserting ellipses into the action of the plot:
for example, cutting away from a knife fight in a corridor, showing us instead a peaceful
village square, and then having the fight spill out into the street a minute later. Hou
admits, “When I cut between scenes, I try to allow the unfinished atmosphere of the last
shot to continue into the next” (Nornes & Yueh-yu Yeh). According to Staging
Memories, this lends to the experience of the film as an “amorphous” whole, rather than a
fragmented series of images. The knife fight especially highlights how violence and
turmoil ripple outward, breaking the peace and cutting through the entire fabric of the
diegetic world. These stylistic choices keep us on our toes: they require an active
attention to detail, and a willingness on our part to engage with the events onscreen.
This need for active viewership also applies to what Reynaud labels “visual
motifs” (66), or repeated images. Upon first viewing, many of Hou’s shots look the
same, and actions appear to repeat themselves (such as the numerous dinner scenes at the
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Lin’s dining room table). But Hou often shoots along what Nornes and Yueh-yu Yeh
dub an “axis”—a line from which certain repeating shots are taken. For example, the
entrance to the Miner’s hospital represents one such “axis”. There are eight separate
shots of that entrance, and all of them are slightly different—in angle, lighting, or
framing. They pop up in various parts of the film—sometimes filled with chatting
nurses, or the awful cries of the wounded. The repetition of this “motif” helps to
develop an aptly-dubbed “emotional residue” with which we can further contextualize the
meaning and purpose of these individual shots (Nornes & Yueh-yu Yeh). Throughout
the film, there are numerous axes to which Hou returns time and time again, including the
dining room, the hospital entrance, and the altar room (which is repeated twenty times
throughout the film, according to the authors).
Hou also makes wonderful use of space in A City of Sadness. Whereas many
directors will use establishing shots to set up the scene for the viewer, Hou’s filmmaking
is surprisingly devoid of such accommodating images. Instead, Hou will often cut to
interiors, which are fragmented by walls, windows, and the respectful distance of the
camera from the action. He will, however, carefully build upon our knowledge of the
place—sometimes showing us more or less of the room. We are like an observer slowly
learning our way around the Lins’ home. According to Reynaud, this also leads to the
sense that the human presence in Hou’s films is “transitory” and “accidental.” She
writes, “[people] are floating over the composition of the shots like unnecessary ghosts”
(64). Hou’s characters often retreat off-screen, although we can still hear their
movements and their chatter outside of the gaze of the camera. In other words, the
setting takes on a life of its own, and we get the feeling that we are looking at real places,
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and real events. Hou’s clever breaking down of space allows the characters in A City of
Sadness to exist outside of the diegetic world, which lends a sense of realism to the film.
In their freedom from observation, they take on a life of their own, and even “resist” the
desire of the spectator to be a part of their interior lives.
Additionally, Hou also refuses to follow some of the principal rules of classical
continuity editing; he hardly ever uses the “shot reverse shot” formula, which makes it
easier to see the action from the main character’s point of view. For example, instead of
supplying context for a conversation between Wen-ching and Hinomi (by cutting to a
shot of Wen-ching from over Hinomi’s shoulder), Hou might simply position the camera
somewhere at the back of the room, and let the scene play out as if we were watching a
theatre performance (Nornes & Yueh-yu Yeh). I find that there is a distinct lack of
pointed close-ups to impress upon us the importance of the people who inhabit these
shots. Men and women drift in and out of Hou’s frames at leisure, and only Hinomi—an
unassuming young nurse—has the privilege of narrating her story and providing a
retrospective account of events.
This brings me to one of the most important aspects of Hou’s filmmaking: the use
of sound, especially within the context of voiceover narration. Overall, however, there is
something eerily quiet about Hou’s filmmaking. He doesn’t often make use of nondiegetic sound, and when he does, the lines are often blurred between what the characters
can hear and what they cannot. Sometimes, there is music playing over a long shot of a
hazy mountain range. Sometimes, there is nothing but the bustling of nurses and
clanging of metal instruments at the hospital. In this movie, the lines between realistic
representation and poetry are blurred. When Hinomi discusses classical literature and
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opera with Wen-Ching, black intertitles—on which we can read Wen-ching’s written
replies—are edited into the film. Sometimes, the words turn into poems—free of
meaningful context; up for interpretation. Many times, the only thread that ties the
narrative actions together is Hinomi’s narration, which is unconventional considering that
she is a woman (and therefore, not privy to the same knowledge of politics as the men).
Earlier, I pointed to the example of Hirohito’s speech over the radio, and I really do
believe that this is a prime example of how Hou regulates male narration to “official”
speeches and broadcasts, whereas a woman carries the Lin family’s personal narrative
(Reynaud 65). She is the voice—that subjective voice—that we must listen to and
believe. In Staging Memories, Nornes and Yueh-yu Yeh point to a text called the
“Acoustic Mirror” by Kaja Silverman. They summarize:
“[The] male voice enjoys a privileged position in the text and is
structured as the site of enunciation. Female voice-over, on the other hand,
is temporally and spatially dislocated from the image track and associated
with interior perspective [...].”
This means that female voiceover is largely used within the narrative to promote
the individual, subjective, and feminine point of view, rather than the objective truth. I
would argue that Hinomi’s position as the only woman who narrates the story of the Lin
family says something about the way in which Hou wanted to represent the traumatic
events of the White Terror. Not only are we ushered into the private sphere—a place
which Hinomi, as a woman, inhabits—but this interior, subjective space provides our
only access to the narrative at all. On the other hand, what Nornes and Yueh-yu Yeh
label as “official history” resists the experience of the individual, and undermines the
validity of the people’s suffering. It is, I think, unfortunately true that the “winners” of a
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conflict will write (or re-write) its history, and that the voices of the people who “lost”
will sink back into the stream of oblivion.
Historically, many of these marginalized voices have been women—even in the
United States, the rhetoric of women’s struggle for equal rights under the law has been
twisted, suppressed, and turned against them. By embracing the point of view of the
oppressed (in the Taiwanese, the disabled, the female), Hou effectively returns the power
that has been taken from them by these “official narratives” of history. One such scene
that really drives home the dichotomy between the masculine, “enunciating” voice and
the subjective female’s is when Hinomi is writing in her diary at the hospital (Nornes &
Yueh-yu Yeh). As she is jotting down her thoughts, however, we can hear an older man
teaching a group of hospital staff how to speak Mandarin in order to accommodate the
people fleeing from the mainland. Amongst the group of people who are learning the
new language is a small girl around ten or eleven years old. Perhaps Hou is attempting
to make a point about the ways in which culture is passed from one generation to the
next, and how this may lead to some narratives being forgotten, while others continue to
be perpetuated. It would appear that Hinomi’s voice—which, in this case, is silently
confined to her diary—is in danger of being drowned out by the voice of the mainlanders
and the KMT. However, overall, her voice is the only one that survives the test of time
and the violence enacted upon her people.
Besides Hinomi, the other central character who actively observes and records
history is Wen-ching. He is largely unable to communicate without his notebook, and
often gets into trouble for his inability to hear and follow orders, but his camera lens
serves to capture and present moments in time that would otherwise be forgotten. In
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many ways, A City of Sadness is a film that bypasses a traditional, masculine retelling of
history. Instead, Hou embraces imperfect human subjectivity, and challenges his
audience to see things from the periphery, like Wen-ching and Hinomi. Throughout the
film, we are not in the middle of the conflict between the Japanese and the Taiwanese, or
the communists and the KMT—nor are we even privy to much of the fighting between
the Lin brothers and the gangsters from Shanghai. Instead, the story of the White Terror
is told through anxious glances between women, uneasy business dinners, and wounded
disillusioned soldiers returning home.
Overall, I believe that the particular aspects of the mise-en-scene laid out by
Reynaud, Ma, Nornes, and Yueh-yu Yeh require the most careful discussion. I also
believe it to be worth reiterating that a film is not merely a story slapped together in an
editing room. No shot, camera movement, nor line of dialogue is an accident. Rather,
every aspect of the film remains in the finished product through a series of choices—
whether they are the director’s or the cinematographer’s. Hou’s decisions to repeat
certain images, or to present his sets as series of fragmented spaces all have important
ramifications.

In this case, Hou’s stylistic choices lend to what Jean Ma labels as a

sense of melancholic longing, or as the title of her book suggests—a “melancholy drift”.
There is definitely a sadness that pervades throughout the entirety of the film; in the
empty rooms, as well as the vacant gazes of the men who have been condemned by the
KMT. Hou’s style is so unobtrusive, and yet the scenes are carefully rendered so that
they echo previous sequences and make us conscious of the “emotional residue” of the
images. This certainly leaves us something to discuss concerning how Hou portrays the
plight of the Taiwanese—and even the Japanese and the mainlanders. Throughout the
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film, I kept wondering, what are these people fighting for, exactly? Why do the KMT
want to re-take the mainland, and what exactly does this film say about the national
identity that they seem desperate to construct?
It is definitely not a simple question to tackle: in A City, identity is a complicated
affair; it’s not merely language or politics that determine who we are. But perhaps it is a
lack of conscious identification that best speaks to Hou’s purpose. Merely claiming that
you are loyal to the cause of the KMT clearly means very little—just as refusing to
comply with their wishes simply results in death. But I do not want to imply that
Taiwanese identity is defined by oppression by other groups, especially since the island
has been, and remains a home to people of many different ethnic backgrounds. But the
question of identity has been at the forefront of the cultural consciousness of Taiwan
since the repeal of martial law in 1987, and I think that its situation does serve as a prime
example of just how complex the concept of a national identity can be. Is it based on
language, or one’s lineage? Politics? Traditions? Or is it simply what one “feels”?
When the mainlanders arrived in the 1940s, many surely felt that the Taiwanese were too
far removed from the motherland and too “Japanese.” Understandably, many islanders
did not feel very “Chinese” either, and considered themselves Taiwanese above all else
(Chang Yen-Tsai 13-14). Regardless of how they identified, however, those who lived
through the White Terror shared a nearly-unspeakable trauma. It is difficult to forget or
to ignore the effects of such events, and I think that this is a facet of identity that interests
Hou a great deal. He does not seem overly concerned with an identity based on
ethnicity, or cultural background. Rather, he explores how a shared experience can shape
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identity, and how a people’s memory of that experience informs the realities of their
present.
One important scene that Jean Ma describes in Melancholy Drift is when Wenching acts as a messenger and delivers the last words of a cellmate who had been
executed. He doesn’t write them down, but he remembers. “[His] memory serves as a
channel between the dead and the living, and by extension as a reservoir of a secret
history [...]” (63). In this sense, history is preserved because it lives on and “persists” in
the memory of those who have experienced it. When those people are gone, the private
history that they espouse will go with them. I think that Hou’s closing shot of the empty
dining room is so effective because it represents our inability to remain and propagate our
stories. Perhaps this is why Hou made Wen-ching a photographer: he captures images
that have since ceased to exist—not unlike Hou as a filmmaker. But while we can rely
upon photographs and film to retain the image, they still require an interpreter—in the
case of A City of Sadness, perhaps this is Hinomi’s role. Now, the story she tells is a
counter-narrative of the “official” history of the island; it is based on memory, and the
subjective act of remembering.
It has become more and more apparent to me that A City of Sadness operates
within an incredibly complex model of history. But it is one that Hou tackles with a sort
of grace that rises from a deep respect of his subjects. I often wonder how we can do
justice to such traumatic events, especially if we have not actually lived through them.
How can we even begin to understand a culture of violence and oppression that we—
especially the most privileged among us—have never experienced? Hou, I think, begins
to answer this question, whether he had thought of it or not. By placing his camera along
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the periphery of a larger event; by choosing to inhabit the realm of subjective experience,
he bypasses the quandary of attempting to represent a set of events that are essentially unrepresentable because of how varied people’s experiences really are. By doing justice to
one (fictional) family, however, Hou positions us so that we can enter into the private
back room of a nearly-inaccessible national memory.
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CHAPTER II:
Chungking Express
The history of Hong Kong is just as complex—and its future just as unclear—as
that of Taiwan. Although it has been settled in some capacity since ~960 CE, Ackbar
Abbas, in “Hong Kong: Culture and the Politics of Disappearance,” argues that the city’s
history—as it is relevant today—lies in its more recent colonial past (2). After the First
Opium War, during which the Chinese and the British clashed over trade imbalances, the
Chinese were compelled to relinquish control of Hong Kong in 1842. There were some
territorial disputes between the Hong Kong people and their new colonizers, but
eventually, the British helped the island to transition into a new era of industry, as well as
worldwide commercial and financial influence. However, the numerous changes
enacted by the British would only deepen the cultural divide between Hong Kong and a
struggling mainland China. In addition, after World War II, the Cultural Revolution
caused a large wave of emigration to Hong Kong. Since the British decided to retain
control of Hong Kong after the war, the culture of the island—influenced by refugees, the
British, as well as immigrants and expats—continued to grow separately from that of the
People’s Republic. “It is not true, as some might wish to believe, that if you scratch the
surface of a Hong Kong person, you will find a Chinese identity waiting to be reborn
[...],” says Abbas (2).
However, by the time Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher visited the PRC in the
early 1980’s, talks between Deng Xiaoping (Mao’s successor) and Hong Kong officials
concerning the future of the city had already taken place. Unsurprisingly, the Chinese
were interested in reclaiming the territory that they felt they had lost in “unequal”
treaties following the Opium Wars. Eventually, after a few years of tense negotiation,
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the British government agreed to officially return Hong Kong to the PRC in June of 1997.
Hong Kong would then be labeled as a “Special Administrative Region”, and under the
“One Country, Two Systems” principle enacted by Deng Xiaoping, it would be allowed
to keep its capitalist economic system (as well as certain individual personal freedoms)
for fifty years hence (Abbas 23).
Hong Kong, Abbas argues, is in a rare position. Its colonial history has
effectively transformed it into a globalized, diverse cultural space that is—in many areas
such as infrastructure and commerce—more secure than its motherland. In this manner,
before the handover in 1997, Hong Kong was nestled somewhere between a system of
colonialism and decolonization. In other words, it exercised a unique sort of power in
global commerce. Abbas uses the term “postcolonial”—and gestures to the fact that the
Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank recently took over the British Midlands Bank, and “not
vice versa” (6). However, the city’s conflicted history has also lead to a strange cultural
identity—one marked by its own imminent disappearance in the face of the handover in
1997. While the majority of the population has a background that is ethnically Chinese,
Abbas proposes that the primary characteristic of this “culture of disappearance” is the
dichotomy between this shared ethnic background and a very different cultural identity
(2). This Hong Kong identity, he argues, has largely been defined by its distinct “lack of
culture.” After all, it is a port city: a “place of transition” (4); historically, there has been
a lot of coming and going. Abbas writes, “Everything floats—currencies, values, [and]
human relations” (4). Because of this intersection of immigrants and mainland Chinese
and British expatriates, the people of Hong Kong largely failed to recognize that they did,
in fact, have a unique culture of their own. However, it was not seen as the culture of
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Hong Kong. It merely was, and it existed without due recognition. This is what Abbas
refers to as “reverse hallucination”: the refusal to see something that is, in fact, there (7).
Hence, the concept of a “culture of disappearance” is not so much an ethnic tradition as a
shared psychosis.
Beginning in the eighties, only a few years before the handover, Hong Kong
found itself on a precipice of sorts. Despite all of the uncertainty surrounding their
imminent integration with the PRC, the people of Hong Kong realized that their way of
life—their culture—might indeed come to an un-ceremonial end. But this raised the
question, “what culture are we talking about?” What exactly is the culture of Hong Kong
that we are going to lose? How does one go about retaining a cultural identity that did
not exist in the first place? This is the culture of disappearance: a sort of identity based
on its imminent loss. However, Abbas goes on to quote Fredric Jameson’s seminal essay
on postmodernism: “[The] dissolution of an autonomous sphere of culture is rather to be
imagined in terms of an explosion [...], an expansion of culture throughout the social
realm [...]” (7). That is, in this era of “late capitalism” and globalism, culture no longer
merely refers to ethnicity, or one’s inherited traditions; instead, it permeates every aspect
of our social and political lives. In many ways, Hong Kong was at the forefront of
Jameson’s concept of postmodern globalization: as a conglomeration of various cultural,
social, and economic traditions, the city itself can serve as an allegory for the emergence
of a new postmodern era. In some ways, we can understand Hong Kong’s return to the
insular PRC as a regression of sorts—an attempt to return to the way things were. This
regression, I would argue, is also an aspect of the culture of disappearance.
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Later in his introduction, however, Abbas discusses how emerging Hong Kong
filmmakers have developed a new lens through which to peer at their city—as it is now,
with all of its idiosyncrasies; free from traditional (East-West, Capitalist-Communist,
Traditional-Modern) “binarisms.” These, Abbas argues, pose a great threat to our seeing
Hong Kong as it truly is; in other words, these binarisms promote cultural disappearance
(25). But first, I believe it is necessary to briefly examine how Hong Kong’s cinema—
often labeled by Chinese and Western critics alike as kitschy and commercialized—came
to reflect on the anxious sociopolitical climate of the 1980’s. Interestingly, the films
coming out of Hong Kong only began to be taken seriously in the 1990’s, with
filmmakers like Wong kar-wai and Stanley Kwan garnering a new sort of international
acclaim. Before that, the “campy” kung fu movies of Bruce Lee and Jackie Chan had
been Hong Kong’s principal cinematic export. The “new” Hong Kong cinema is
different, Abbas argues, because it turns inward and chooses Hong Kong itself as a
subject (23). Before the handover was announced, it was as if “stories about Hong Kong
always turned into stories about somewhere else” (25). However, Abbas warns that our
use of the aforementioned binarisms also threaten to make Hong Kong disappear—or
worse, be overlooked in favor of a simpler, but already vanishing set of clichéd images.
In this sense, “[the main task of the new Hong Kong cinema] is to find means of
outflanking, or simply keeping pace with, a subject always on the point of disappearance”
(26). We should not, then, be interested in the Hong Kong that lies between the
traditional and the modern, or the East and the West. That Hong Kong is already gone—
“deja disparu.” So, these new filmmakers seem to be engaged in what is effectively a
high-speed chase: an attempt to pin down what makes Hong Kong special. And in an era
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defined by progression and transformation, they choose to distort both space and time—
allowing us to experience a cultural moment free from the confines of the traditional (and
thus, misleading) filmic image.
And if we look at Wong kar-wai’s Chungking Express (1994), the city and the
people of Hong Kong certainly take on a life of their own. We are acquainted with the
city in a dazzling flash of immediacy, as if Wong is saying, “Look! Before it’s too late!”
Of course, one might argue that the events of the late twentieth century would inevitably
find their way into the popular art of the city. But here, perhaps, is where we might go
back to Fredric Jameson’s concept of “third world literature” and the national allegory. It
is not that Hong Kong cinema, which is—according to Abbas—necessarily
commercialized (unlike Chinese films in the 80’s, which were funded by the state),
explicitly sought to represent the cultural mindset of Hong Kong during the 1980’s and
90’s (21). But how could it not? As good, critical viewers, we must examine these films
within the framework of the culture that produced them. When Chungking Express
makes excessive use of the motif of expiration dates, Wong is more than aware of the
implications of doing so. However, popular cinema in Hong Kong is rarely overtly
political: for example, not once in Chungking Express is the handover mentioned. It is,
however, a ubiquitous presence.
But before I elaborate further, let me offer a brief overview of the narrative:
firstly, Chungking Express tracks two distinct yet concurrent plotlines. The first follows
Cop 223 (Takeshi Kaneshiro), or He Qi Wu, as he attempts to flirt with a mysterious
woman (Brigitte Lin) donning a blond wig. We are also privy to her point of view as she
attempts to organize a group of Indian immigrants to transport cocaine. Later, as she
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struggles to track them down through the crowded alleys of the Chungking Jungle in
Tsim Sha Tsui, He Qi Wu attempts to get over his girlfriend May by jogging and gorging
himself on tins of pineapple and chef’s salad. He also frequents the Midnight Express
food stall in the Central district, which is where another girl, also named May, is
currently employed. But by the time 223 decides that he wants to ask May out, she
leaves for good, and Faye (Faye Wong)—our heroine of the second half—is hired
instead. During the second act, Cop 663 (played with great sensitivity by Tony Leung)
also languishes and hangs around the Midnight Express after his stewardess girlfriend
leaves him. He meets Faye, who is immediately interested in him, but 663 is entirely
oblivious—even after she breaks into his apartment numerous times to clean and
organize. She even begins to replace his belongings, which should arguably raise a red
flag. But he writes it off as his emotional state “influencing” his perception of his
environment. When he finally catches her in the act, however, he begins to change his
mind about her; decides to give her a chance. But she has flown off to California—the
subject of her favorite song, California Dreamin’. By the time she comes back, Cop 663
has gotten back into the groove of things, and is finally ready to commit.
The film, in many ways, relies on preconceived notions of genre, and it seems to
fit into the schema of the romantic comedy (Lafrance): the plot can tend toward the
convoluted, and the characters seem so caught up in their own misery that they fail to
recognize when love is knocking at their door. Of course, Chungking Express isn’t a
traditional “Rom-Com”—there are moments which are morbid, disgusting, and even
violent in nature. The first half, I think, is more of a crime flick than a comedy. But
Wong isn’t interested in coloring within the lines of any particular genre. In a way, his
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subversion of genre expectations is similar to the desire of the new school of Hong Kong
filmmakers to subvert common clichés of Hong Kong culture. But Wong doesn’t
necessarily do away with them entirely, as one might expect (Teo 49). After all, they
draw in an audience. Rather, he turns them on their head and forces the viewer to really
grapple with the image onscreen, instead of allowing us to indulge in our habit of
refusing to see (or to understand) what is really there. He also does this through the
film’s stylistic flair for spatial and temporal distortion, as well as his use of uncanny
narrative parallels and repetitions.
The very beginning of the film, which is a decidedly dreamy chase sequence, sets
the tone for the remainder. Immediately, Hong Kong appears to us as both a setting and a
subject—an overpopulated, bustling series of twists and turns. The faces of the people
are blurred through a technique called “smudge-motion,” which involves shooting at
double-speed and then slowing down the finished product. As we follow Brigitte Lin’s
Blonde Woman past the neon shop windows and overcrowded alleys of the Chungking
Mansions, Cop 223’s voiceover proclaims that,
“Every day, we brush past so many other people. People we may never
meet, or people who may become close friends. [...] This was the closest
[she and I] ever got—just 0.01 of a centimeter between us.”
The last sentence refers to when Lin knocks into him without stopping to turn back.
Obviously, Cop 223’s monologue isn’t entirely true. The two do more than “brush
elbows”—they eventually meet in a cheap bar and then go to a hotel room together, even
if all she does is sleep. But they do speak; they do get to know a little bit about each
other’s lives. Perhaps they don’t get much closer in the “getting-to-know-one-another”
sense, but she also rests her head on his shoulder. So what does he mean, “the closest we
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ever got”? Perhaps it was the potential in their meeting that drew 223’s attention; the
possibility that they might someday become close friends, or lovers. Anything is
possible in the Jungle. The area contains many different types of people—a motley
population of immigrants, foreign travelers, and natives. Wong admits,
“[It] is a mix of different cultures...it is a legendary place where the
relations between the people are very complicated. It has always
fascinated and intrigued me. It is also a permanent hotspot for the cops in
HK because of the illegal traffic that takes place there. That masspopulated and hyperactive place is a great metaphor for the town herself”
(Lafrance).
I found Wong’s personification of the city to be particularly telling: to him, the city is
more than a city—it is a subject; a character. And the mix of people to which Wong
refers is present from the get-go: some of the first characters we meet are the ill-fated
Indian drug mules who cross Blonde Woman by disappearing with her product. We are
also introduced to a white American man who forces one of his preferred sex workers (I
am making a leap by presuming she is) to wear a blonde wig à la Lin’s character. And
then, when 223 goes up to her in the bar, he says hello in multiple languages—including
English—in order to elicit a response. It is easy to see how the people of Hong Kong
might not consider their own culture as its own distinct entity; worthy of study apart from
the traditions and cultural practices of “elsewhere.” The characters eat American food—
fries, burgers, and chef’s salads. We see the bright red and white colors of the Coca
Cola logo at the Midnight Express, and hear foreign music throughout the film—
especially California Dreamin’ and What a Difference a Day Makes, by Dinah
Washington. At the bar that the American frequents, Things in Life—written by the
Reggae artist Dennis Brown, always seems to play in the background. There is also a
Punjabi track called Piplan di Chhan that plays during the drug trafficking scene of the

32
first half. Overall, it’s an impressive assortment that clearly identifies Hong Kong as
representative of Jameson’s notion of globalization.
Clearly, Chungking Express takes place in an era of global transmission—an era
of postmodernity in which we are all acutely aware of the cultural and political goings-on
across the globe. And Hong Kong—with all of its cultures clashing and borrowing from
one another—is a prime example of this. In Chungking Express, Wong seems fearful for
the future of this multicultural mecca. It is, for all intents and purposes, a capitalist city
that exists in what Fredric Jameson calls an “era of multinational capitalism.” As Abbas
reminds us, the disconnect between the economic and political realities of Hong Kong
and its uncertain future with the PRC threatened the city with imminent disappearance.
Perhaps this is why 223 is obsessed with finding cans of pineapple with the May 1st
expiration date, and why Wong lingers on the image of cat food marked with the same
numbers, even as the white American lies dead in the periphery of the shot.
However, the songs I mentioned earlier do more than merely provide an example
of how Hong Kong is a global city. They also allow us to identify certain characters—
linking them to specific locations and events in the narrative (Teo 54). For example,
when Things in Life begins to play on the jukebox, we know where we are. We know
that this particular song only plays in relation to Blonde Woman and the American man.
And when Faye swings her hips to California Dreamin’, we recall other instances of her
creeping around 663’s apartment, or perhaps their first meeting at the Midnight Express.
Music is only one mechanism by which Wong prompts us to regain a sense of direction
in the narrative—it connects us to certain characters, and the characters to their local
haunts. The music also seems to exist, to an extent, outside of the framework of space-
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time. Sometimes, it is diegetic—sometimes not. Occasionally, it is a mixture of both.
But it always brings us back to the same, familiar space in which we first heard it. The
songs are arguably anachronistic—they belong to a different time, and hearing the first
new notes of California Dreamin’ can be disorienting. But soon enough, it becomes
Faye’s song; specific to her, and specific to her love for 663. In Stephen Teo’s “SpaceTime Tango,” Teo argues that time and space in Chungking Express only exist within the
framework of human memory and experience—a phenomenon that he calls “durée,” or
“lived time.” He writes,
“Space itself can only attain its wholeness by being lived in.
Chungking Mansions is a virtual dimension of memory. Its space is
a vivid time-filled (hence human and psychological) entity” (53).
Essentially, space and time in Chungking Express are inherently united with human
experience. When Wong represents the passing of time after 663 and Faye’s first
meeting, he slips an unobtrusive cut into the scene, featuring Faye wearing a different
shirt than before. It’s easy to miss it: the situation is almost exactly the same. Faye is
dancing around her work station, much to the chagrin of her boss. But whatever
happened between the two events is not important: what matters is Faye falling in love, as
implied by this visual distortion of time.
But Abbas certainly doesn’t let us forget that Hong Kong has always been
perceived as a place of transience and change. Everything moves quickly; as Wong
himself said, it is “hyperactive.” One aspect of disappearance, he argues, is the sense
that things are moving too quickly, and that we are unable to grasp an image before it is
“swept out from under us.” Signs of time passing are everywhere in Chungking
Express—so much so that it is nearly impossible to forget about it. Analog clocks are
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always ticking down, songs play on repeat, and 223’s obsession with expiration dates is
perhaps the most telling sign of all. He laments, “I wonder if there’s anything in the
world that won’t expire.” The characters also discuss time as if they know exactly what
is going to happen in the future—blending the line between fantasy and reality. “In 57
hours,” says Cop 223, “[Faye] will fall in love with another man [663].” There is no
question about it: like the imminent handover, “unknowable” future events loom in the
back of our minds. But Wong—with cinematographers Christopher Doyle and Andrew
Lau—is also quite skilled at representing his preoccupation with spatial-temporal
boundaries in the film’s visual style. Michael Korsky of “Reverse Shot” discusses how
Doyle follows Faye around 663’s (in reality, it was Doyle’s) cramped apartment. The
camera trails her through tight spaces with a striking “fluidity,” like the miniature
airplane Faye flies around the fish tank. As California Dreamin’ plays sensually in the
background, Faye’s half-dance, half- exploration of this forbidden space seems both
painfully extended (we can’t help but think, what if the cop comes back? What if he
catches you?) and compressed, like a montage. Her cleaning, which appears to take
most of the day, takes only a few minutes of screen time.
Stephen Teo also outlines how Wong expands and compresses space, as well as
time—making it seem as if we are really looking at a plane landing on a giant woman’s
back, or making us believe that two distinct districts in Hong Kong are only a stone’s
throw away from each other (59). In the former, there is a scene during the second half
in which 663 flies a little model plane around his girlfriend, making it chase her; land on
her spine as if it were tarmac. Needless to say, Doyle is adept at capturing this sequence
as if the airplane were really an airplane. It looks as if 663’s apartment has suddenly
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transformed to include great open valleys, and the slope of the woman’s body lends to her
becoming a landing strip for an international flight. This magnification and breaking
down of the space in the apartment truly lends to what Teo calls “durée”—that sense that
the human presence here makes the space more than an apartment (53). It is lived in; it
holds memories—so much so that they transform the space into something entirely
different from what it was before. This same effect is highlighted later when Faye plays
with the airplane in the same manner; flying it into the fish tank instead.
But the clever use of space that I found most striking is Wong’s ability to make
the Chungking Mansions (in Tsim Sha Tsui, in the district of Yau Tsim Mong) and the
Central district (where the restaurant and Cop 663’s apartment are located) look like the
same place. Teo writes that in the Hong Kong release of the film, Cop 223 takes a ferry
across the harbor in order to highlight how the story is moving from one part of Hong
Kong to another. But in the international version, there is no such scene. Instead, the two
places blur into each other—Hong Kong takes on the appearance of one big maze, with
people inhabiting little alcoves and alleyways of the same twisting, turning place (Teo
54). This is, of course, not how Hong Kong natives might see it. But for the foreign
audience—for us—it works. Now, all of Hong Kong fits together like a living jigsaw
puzzle of culture and commerce. The two halves of the film seem to take place in order,
but in reality, they are happening concurrently at different ends of the city—only two of
the countless, complex human narratives occurring simultaneously across the globe. But
Chungking Express is more than a Chinese film that plays with familiar styles slapped
onto a new city. Of course, now, we might ask ourselves how all of this fits into Abbas’
concept of the culture of disappearance. I believe that he would argue that Wong’s
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distortions of time and space “problematize” the visual (48)—freeing it of any clichés or
binarisms; forcing us to really search for meaning in a film that might appear to be little
more than a clever study of film genre.
Essentially, Abbas argues that direct questions about the nature of Hong Kong
identity, such as in Evan Chan’s To Liv(e), are not effective in really capturing the
magnitude of Hong Kong’s cultural malaise. So, instead, directors like Wong and
Stanley Kwan present a new take on Hong Kong through the “provocation of fantasy” in
their film style (49). However, he notes that these auteurs have also been criticized for
being decidedly “apolitical”. In response to this criticism, Abbas quotes Gilles Deleuze:
in terms of narrative, representing the “mutations” in national identity and culture
actually allows for a more nuanced political awareness (49). In a film like Chungking
Express, questions related to the disappearance of identity may not necessarily be
obvious or easy to grasp—especially for those of us who do not experience the day-today existence of Hong Kong. But, if we know the history of the place, these questions
become pointed; they subvert our desire to be satisfied with a superficial exploration of a
complex identity. Of course, as per his usual style, Wong leaves the film without a firm
sense of resolution—similar to how Hong Kong is left without any real idea of what the
future might hold. When 663 and Faye smile at each other over the counter of the newly
renovated Midnight Express, we cannot help but think that maybe, things will be all right.
But if the current political unrest in Hong Kong is any indication of the city’s future
relationship with the PRC, then I cannot help but fear that perhaps Hong Kong is farther
from China than ever.
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CHAPTER III:
A Touch of Sin
In the past two chapters, I have spent a good deal of time discussing people who
exist on the margins of the influence of the People’s Republic. Now, I face the task of
peering into the psyche of the mainland itself. It seems to act, in a way, as an epicenter of
sociopolitical conflict—the ripples of which are felt by those on the periphery of China’s
narrative of history. At the same time, it would be criminal to neglect the stories of the
people who reside within the PRC—after all, throughout the twentieth century, they bore
witness to an alarming string of changes in nearly every facet of life. Within the space of
forty years, China had seen the Qing dynasty fall, a national government (the KMT) rise,
the formation of the Communist Party (and then conflict with the KMT), the Japanese
invasion, the eviction of the Japanese, and finally the victory of the communists over the
nationalists. During many of these years, the general population had to make do with
little food and even less security—whether in their livelihoods, their future, or in their
personal safety. Few families were unscathed by these events. If they hadn’t been
mistreated by the Japanese in Manchuria, they were suspected of being sympathizers, or
condemned and blacklisted by the communists for having nationalist ties. But before the
nationalists lost control in any given countryside town, many families who refused to
give the soldiers special treatment were denounced for being communists. There was no
winning.
But as the communists “liberated” various portions of China from the KMT,
things appeared to be going quite well for the average Chinese. The communist soldiers
seemed honorable, and they reportedly treated KMT prisoners with respect. The CPC
government also sent food to poorer, rural regions which had previously struggled
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through the Japanese and KMT occupation. As Jung Chang writes in Wild Swans, “The
Communists proved extremely efficient at restoring order and getting the economy going
again” (113). But within the Party itself, Chang insists, the manner in which new
recruits were treated seemed lacking. Chang’s mother, the wife of a prominent Party
member, had to prove her worth through physical hardship. But even as Chang’s mother
gained the trust of the Party, she realized that it would not live up to her expectations.
Many of the cultural and social traditions (such as living close to family and showing
affection to one’s children) with which she had been raised were deemed “bourgeois”
(162) and selfish. The revolution, she discovered, would largely take place in the mind.
“Mao wanted not only external discipline, but the total subjugation of all thoughts, large
or small” (164). Meetings in which party members “self-criticized” and atoned for their
privilege took up much of their time and effectively “eliminated the private sphere” of
Party life (165). Of course, despite some members’ best efforts, corruption and greed
festered. Higher-ups could essentially determine the worth of any subordinate member
based on personal preferences. At the same time, many innocent people who weren’t in
the Party were accused of being capitalists or rightists, and were ostracized from their
communities.
But perhaps it was Mao’s economic policies during the “Great Leap Forward”
that would be truly detrimental to China’s wellbeing. Mao had organized the country
into working communes, which would supposedly feed themselves with a “surplus” of
food. At one point, Chang writes, “[telling] fantasies to oneself as well as others, and
believing them, was practiced to an incredible degree” (224). Farmers and local officials
lied about levels of production, since many would be beaten until they admitted to
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massive (and entirely falsified) increases in output. However, because of Mao’s interest
in steel production, in reality, agriculture was largely neglected. Predictably, food
shortages—and eventually famine—followed. But of course, Party officials were treated
to better rations, and many enjoyed their health throughout the shortages. But even after
the fiasco of the Great Leap Forward, the so-called “Cult of Mao” seemed to grow
stronger—especially as the economy steadied.
However, Mao continued to grow paranoid about the image of his regime, and
even turned against the arts. He eventually banned a genre of theater Chang calls “ghost
dramas,” which contained stories of spirits seeking vengeance on those who had harmed
them. Chang reasons that because the Chinese often express their discontent through
“allusions” to the past, Mao felt that these plays might subvert his favorable standing in
the public eye. She quips that the ghosts might have resembled the spirits of those he
had labeled as “class enemies” (273). Mao eventually turned against many of his own
Party members, whom he decried as “capitalist-roaders.” Even when he was forced to
relinquish some control in Party politics, he was determined to work outside of their
regulations in order to “destroy” this dissension in the ranks (276). This movement
helped to usher in what is known as the Cultural Revolution—a series of events which
have arguably defined Mao’s legacy in present-day China. Chang writes, “to achieve
[absolute loyalty] he needed terror—an intense terror that would block all other
considerations [...]” (283). The goal of this “revolution” of thought was to demolish “the
four olds”: culture, ideas, customs, and habits. People with nationalist connections,
landowners, and other “capitalists” had always been Mao’s enemy. But now, even
“writers, artists, scholars, and most other top professionals, who had been privileged
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under the Communist regime” (284), were considered the enemy as well. No one seems
to know for sure how many people were persecuted, tortured, blacklisted, or killed under
the haphazard actions of Mao’s Red Guards, although the number is surely in the
millions.
Eventually, after the country had come to a nearly complete standstill—
economically, politically, and socially—Mao, who still enjoyed a great deal of support
amongst the people, declared in 1969 that the Revolution was over. However, it wasn’t
until after his death a decade later that Deng Xiaoping and other reform leaders began to
rectify many of Mao’s lingering policies. Now, for the sake of brevity, I must brush over
a few years: from the “end” of the Cultural Revolution to Mao’s death. It is not that
what happened in those years is not important; but for the sake of my argument, a
rudimentary knowledge of what happened after the “Cult of Mao” fizzled out is
absolutely necessary. After Mao’s death in 1979, change seemed inevitable, especially
due to the nation’s lingering economic struggles. According to Ronald Coase and Wing
Nang, authors of “How China Became Capitalist”, the process of China’s economic
reform was inherently divided: there was government intervention, and then there were
grassroots movements. For example, reformers in the Party sought to “decentralize
foreign trade and [give] more fiscal autonomy to provincial governments”, in addition to
“incentivizing state enterprises.” But at the same time, slowly and without fanfare,
people in the countryside moved away from the communes and returned to private
farming. In addition, small private businesses—which were mostly run by displaced
young people who could not find jobs through the state—started to spring up in urban
areas (Coase & Wang). Industry also boomed in smaller towns, and the black market
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was integral in supplying “village enterprises” with the materials necessary to
manufacture goods. Coase and Wang claim that these new “business firms” quickly
began to displace the state’s.
However, while China’s economy has grown considerably since the 70’s and
80’s, its government has largely remained firm in its dedication to upholding the old
communist ideology. Criticism of the state, for example, is not taken lightly. When
students and intellectuals protested in Tiananmen Square in the summer of 1989, they
petitioned the government for free speech and free press, a crackdown on corruption, and
for workers to retain control over industry (Atshan & Tedla). Despite their ideals being
similar to what the Communist Party had originally wanted, their demonstrations were
renounced as “counter-revolutionary,” and armed troops were sent into the square to clear
them out. This is what Jia Zhangke is eager to explore in A Touch of Sin. It is this
disparity between reality and ideology that he represents allegorically through the
movie’s various narrative threads. In short, this disparity feeds a system in which the
rich can get richer, but the poor are stagnated at the bottom; unable to claim that they
have been treated unfairly, due to corruption within the government itself. This type of
oppression, Jia argues, breeds violence (Adams). In order to show us the scope of the
suffering of everyday China, Jia breaks the film into four distinct episodes. While the
threads of these episodes do intermittently tie together, they are—for the most part—
distinct. The first tells the story of a worker called Dahai who takes the law into his own
hands when corrupt village officials take advantage of the townspeople. The second
features a vicious young man who visits his tight-knight family in the countryside, and
the third follows a woman who finally decides to exact revenge on the rich men who treat
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her like dirt. Finally, the fourth segment introduces us to a man who would rather kill
himself than continue living a colorless, paycheck-to-paycheck lifestyle. But Jia didn’t
simply make these people up; rather, all of the events represented have a historical
precedent of some kind. Perhaps the most famous reference, however, is to the Foxconn
suicide epidemic, which has claimed the lives of over 20 factory workers since 2010. But
violence against the self is still violence. Jia himself admits,
“These four characters all came from news reports from China; they’re all people
who have endured severe acts of violence, and who have since transformed from
victims to being perpetrators of violence themselves” (Adams).
According to Sam Adams of the film magazine The Dissolve, Jia heard about
most of these stories through a social media site called Weibo (he calls it the Chinese
answer to Twitter). According to Jia, the question of violence—whether it be
metaphorical or physical—is key to understanding the events of A Touch of Sin.
Violence, he claims, is not the natural response of human beings to injustice. But when
these injustices of society continue to build up, and the people’s voices are continually
silenced, then there is no other way to express anger, or disappointment (Adams). He
finishes, “Violence becomes a mode of expression for those who do not have the
language to express themselves in these moments.” But there is an implicit question
here, although Jia does not directly address it in this interview with Dissolve. Through
Jia’s depiction of these characters’ lives, we can see how they perceive injustice; how
they roll with the blows, or fight back. But he wants us to ask, what caused their
suffering? Where did this injustice come from, if China is truly a communist society?
Unfortunately, injustice seems to permeate every strata of Chinese life. Not one
character is untouched by the social, political, and economic malaise that has burdened
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the PRC over the past few decades. This is why it is of the utmost importance to have a
firm grasp on the nation’s history. Regardless of what has happened to propel China into
the global economy, it would seem that one foot remains in its recent past—trapped by a
cultural paradigm of silence, suffering, and violence that emerged during the time of
Mao. Now, while Mao’s economic policies may have been lifted, they have been
replaced by a system which allows for the rich to take advantage of the poor, and for
local governments to discretely turn their heads, all the while preaching that every person
receives their due share. These events have precedence as well: Party higher-ups were
never subject to the same level of scrutiny as the everyday men and women. They didn’t
starve during the Great Leap Forward; they weren’t repeatedly driven by slander and
shame to commit suicide. Even Mao burst outside of Party regulations to weed out the
capitalist “demons” and monsters within its administration (Chang). China is no stranger
to corruption, profiteering, and state-sanctioned violence, and in each of the episodes, the
dichotomy between the old and the new China (which still embraces the old ideology)
becomes apparent.
That being said, I would like to take a bit of time to discuss Jia’s film style before
diving into the narrative. As I noted earlier, this is largely a film about violence, and
about the people in the margins of Chinese society. Therefore, Jia is first and foremost
invested in a sense of realism: he never shies away from showing blood and gore, and his
use of sound is impeccable: the stretches of pained silence feel all too real, as do the
shotgun blasts, the drone of machinery, and whinnies of a horse in distress. But there is
something otherworldly in Jia’s painterly landscapes of China. All of the colors seem to
pop—the lush greenery, the bluish haze of the mountains. Everything seems wide and
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open—the characters are surrounded by space; so much so that it feels alienating. These
are desperate people who have nowhere else to turn. Sometimes, all they have for
company is a minimal non-diegetic score—peppered with traditional Chinese
instrumentals and gentle, humming bass notes. But it never stands in for Jia’s visuals—
as in, it never displaces what’s happening on screen by drawing our attention away from
what we see. His camera work is similarly unobtrusive—it is nearly always steady, and
so the film lacks the jerky grittiness of one shot with a handheld. However, for A Touch
of Sin, style doesn’t quite unlock the allegorical aspects of the film—at least, not to the
same extent as in Chungking Express or A City of Sadness. Instead, the impact of Jia’s
film largely comes from the plight of the characters themselves.
The first segment of A Touch of Sin takes place in the Shanxi Province, and
follows a man called Dahai. He lives in a small, unnamed village that shelters a
neglected statue of Mao Zedong near the town center. Its state of disrepair immediately
gives us an indication as to the importance of Mao’s ideals in the town proceedings. But
if that weren’t enough to clue us in, Dahai continually rants and raves against the
corruption of local officials who have pocketed money from selling off collectively
owned property. But nobody else wants to listen. His friends brush him off and make
fun of him for his noisy insistence. Eventually, when he publicly confronts his former
boss (who became rich from keeping money intended for the village) he is beaten and
then bribed to stay silent. But perhaps the real tragedy here is that Dahai attempted to
lodge a complaint to Beijing through the official channels, when confronting the man
face-to-face had failed. But when his request to make a complaint is ignored, Dahai
reaches his breaking point. He dons his olive green, Communist-style coat, wraps his
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hunting rifle in a cloth adorned with a tiger, struts down Main Street past the statue of
Mao, and then murders the men he had previously confronted—including his former
boss. Dahai then takes the time to shoot a man who mercilessly beats his horse, and we
cannot help but see the parallels between Dahai and the poor animal. Jia’s presentation
of Dahai; tall and proud, with a tiger-clad rifle propped over his shoulder, provokes an
association with Wu Song the “tiger killer”: a famous outlaw in Chinese literature
(Rayns). But these murders do not feel legendary; we get the feeling that Dahai will not
pass into folklore. It’s simply duty to him—what needs to be done. As Jia might argue,
violence is Dahai’s last resort, since nothing else seems to achieve justice. In this
segment especially, Jia puts the system of “new” China, which allows local governments
to sell off collective property to turn a profit, on trial. The disconnect between the
lifestyle of Dahai’s boss—who travels in a private airplane and receives a traditional
ceremonial welcome—and that of the villagers is staggering. They struggle to make ends
meet while entrepreneurs get rich on their misfortune. It seems like a slap in the face to
communist ideology, and yet, that is what the Chinese government continues to espouse.
I will return to the second segment, but for now, the parallels between the first
and the third stories are too immediate to ignore. Zheng Xiaoyu, a thirty-something
woman, makes ends meet by working various jobs, including one as a receptionist in a
sauna. This particular sauna, however, doubles as a brothel. Regardless, Xiaoyu upholds
that she is merely the receptionist: she is unwilling to put herself in the position of a
“masseuse,” even when she is offered a good amount of money to do so. “I am not a
prostitute,” she insists to two belligerent customers. Upon her refusal to indulge the men
who ask for her, they become indignant and angry. One of them, whom we have
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previously seen extort an illegal toll from poor construction workers, asks, “You think
you’re better than me?” He begins to beat her around the head with a wad of cash, and
continues to scream, “I have fucking money!” as he slaps her. It is eerily reminiscent of
the scene in the first segment in which the villager beats his horse. But here, in one fluid
motion, Xiaoyu pulls out a knife, slices open his chest, and then plunges the blade into
his stomach when he lunges for her. She pulls back, and without so much as a flinch,
cuts his throat. We see the second man run for his life before she makes her way
outside, down the road, and into the gathering dark. Like Dahai, she respects the law,
and dials emergency services to turn herself in. Stylistically (and thematically), this
segment resembles Jia’s beloved wuxia films, which feature tales of vengeance and
heroes skilled in martial arts (Adams). Only now, Jia repurposes a predominantly
historically-based genre to fit modern times, similar to how Chang’s “ghost dramas”
allude to contemporary issues.
The fourth segment of A Touch of Sin is equally pessimistic about the relationship
between China’s bleak past and bleaker future. Perhaps this is why the protagonist of this
piece is in his early twenties: more so than Xiaoyu or Dahai, Xiaohui embodies a sort of
fresh-faced innocence which makes his eventual suicide all the more shocking.
Throughout his screen time, his naiveté—concerning relationships, money, and hard
work—slowly ebbs away, only to be replaced by a chilling sense of disappointment.
First, he turns away from his old job when he is forced to pay for a friend’s injury leave.
Of course, he cannot afford it, so he runs away to work at a “nightclub” called The
Golden Age, where young women dress in revealing uniforms inspired by the old Red
Guards. In addition, the club is fitted with special rooms designed to look like train cars
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that would carry Party officials across the countryside. As Xiaohui watches the woman
he fancies, Lianrong, cater to one of their “distinguished guests” in a train car, he hears
her ask, “Where are we going?” The man sighs exaggeratedly, and as Lianrong kisses his
chest, laments, “Young people nowadays have no sense of direction.” While that much
certainly isn’t true, it may be the case that the young women at the nightclub have simply
become numb to the suffering of the world—a case of what Fredric Jameson might call
postmodern apathy.
Throughout the scenes at the Golden Age, we watch bored women playing with
their smartphones, trying to ignore the impassive gazes of the men who would buy their
company. Then, when Xiaohui and Lianrong sit in an empty room browsing the web, she
tells him about two stories: one, a female executive was found in possession of nearly
130 Luis Vuitton handbags worth over 2 million Yuan. The second: a deadly mine
explosion that killed “dozens” of people—in the same province where Dahai lives.
Xiaohui and Lianrong post the same comment on both stories: “WTF.” Not “what the
fuck,” just a flippant WTF. Although we see Xiaohui becoming more and more
despondent, especially when Lianrong refuses his advances, his death still comes as a
surprise. When he throws himself from the balcony of an apartment block called the
“Oasis of Prosperity,” he does so without any great commotion; without seeking help or
saying goodbye. His face is expressionless, and his descent is silent, save for the noise of
his body hitting the pavement. In that moment, Jia makes us all think “WTF?” Is that it?
But this suicide stands in for the most notable events that Jia borrows from China’s
modern history: a string of suicides at factories owned by Foxconn, which has
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manufactured devices for Apple, HP, Dell, Sony, and Microsoft...amongst others
(Pogue).
I wouldn’t argue that Xiaohui is apathetic, necessarily, but his startling lack of
affect during his suicide recalls our protagonist from the second portion of the film: Zhou
San. The second segment shows Zhou coming home to the countryside in order to
attend his mother’s birthday celebration. There, it becomes clear that the other members
of the community—and even his family—don’t trust him. We know why: Zhou first
appears at the beginning of Dahai’s segment to coolly kill four would-be motorcycle
thieves. Later in the second part, he treats his family relatively well, but then returns to
the city and promptly murders a wealthy-looking couple for their money. But unlike the
other characters’ resorting to violence, Zhou’s use of violence feels decidedly
impersonal—he kills in cold blood, and he simply does not care about the consequences.
He kills because he’s bored, and “shooting guns isn’t boring.” This part of the film
stands out to me; it seems out of place in the midst of these stories of vengeance and
retribution. Zhou San is a man who kills people who are, as far as we know, innocent: he
shoots a woman whose only crime seems to be that she dresses nicely. In this way, Zhou
might represent a broader, cultural malaise which stands apart from the confusion and the
anger of Dahai, Xiaoyu, and Xiaohui. Zhou seems to have no greater purpose—he
merely exists, and his lack of affect and emotional depth is truly unnerving. He is
Jameson’s concept of apathy taken to its logical extreme—a grim portrait of a generation
of working class people who have nothing to gain, and nothing to lose. In that way, he
reminds me of Xiaohui—except Xiaohui resorts to violence against the self, rather than
violence directed outward.
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Finally, toward the end of the movie, we see Xiaoyu return from her ordeal. She
now sports a short haircut, and wears a pleasant, placid smile on her face. We quickly
learn that she is applying for a job in a factory similar to where Xiaohui worked, except
this factory is owned by the company that lost their CEO to Dahai. During her interview,
when she is prompted to explain why she has moved so far from home, Xiaoyu insists
that her past is far behind her. However, as she walks back toward some unknown
destination, she comes across a public performance of a traditional Chinese opera, Yu
Tang Chun. It tells the story of a woman who is accused of a murder that she did not
commit. As an actress tearfully explains to the audience that she has failed to defend her
honor, the judge demands of her, “Do you understand your sin?” Here, Jia cuts to the
audience—a sea of tanned, wrinkled, expressionless faces. In this shot, Xiaoyu is
nowhere to be seen. Rather, just for a moment, Jia forces us to face the men and women
who suffer for sins that they did not commit, and do not fully understand. Part of the
reason this scene is so striking, however, is that it features people gazing directly into the
camera—“breaking the fourth wall,” as it were, and putting us on the spot.
From the perspective of a privileged spectator, suddenly, all of these people are
looking at us, and we know—deep down—that we are, in part, responsible for their
suffering. We buy Foxconn-manufactured products without knowing anything about the
company, and without concern for their unhappy workers. After all, how many of us
really take the time to consider that many of the products we use every day (our
smartphones, laptops, etc.) are built by Chinese laborers who are routinely take advantage
of? Unwittingly, we have also benefitted from the hardships of China’s working class.
Unsurprisingly, A Touch of Sin was not popular with the government in Beijing, and
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although the Film Bureau had pre-approved the script, it has since been banned in
mainland China. So I wonder, how many Chinese have seen A Touch of Sin, and been
asked the question, “Do you understand your sin?” How many have identified with the
protagonist of that opera and thought, I don’t deserve this?
Regardless, Jia’s film clearly gestures to a startlingly large rift between China’s
policy and ideology, which results in the social ills that Jia represents in A Touch of Sin.
As I mentioned earlier, however, we should be careful not to forget that the concept of
“allegory” is not a simple one-to-one exchange. Jia’s is more of a framework—a model
through which to explain the finer points of the modern Chinese experience. And it is an
experience marred by dissatisfaction and dissent, which is the very polar opposite of what
a socialist state should hope to achieve. Still, throughout the film, there are clear
references to the tumultuous history of China—the communist-era costumes, the statue of
Mao—which beg the question, what composes Jia’s concept of Chinese identity? What
separates the average Chinese from the average Taiwanese? Or resident of Hong Kong?
It seems to me that Jia espouses a similar perception of national identity to Hou HsiaoHsien’s.
Throughout A Touch of Sin, there are references which, arguably, all Chinese
would understand. There is a shared past here—one defined by collective trauma and
memory. When the women in the Golden Age march by dressed in uniforms meant to
resemble the communist army’s, Jia is representing an aspect of China’s history that he
knows people will recognize, and even remember. He knows that people will recognize
references to the wuxia genre, and that we will know Mao’s likeness when we see it. In
this manner, despite its style being perhaps the most visually appealing of these three
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films, I think that there is something about A Touch of Sin that makes it difficult for
Westerners to fully appreciate. If we cannot grasp at least a few of complexities of
Chinese history and culture, it becomes challenging to contextualize the events in the
film. It is the ultimate irony, then, that A Touch of Sin has been banned in the one nation
that will truly understand it.
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CONCLUSION
When I told an acquaintance of mine that I was writing my thesis on Chinese
cinema, he looked at me and asked something along the lines of, “Aren’t there better
Asian cinemas to write about? Like Japanese?” I said that he might be surprised. Later,
an old friend from elementary school asked, “They make movies in China?” I said yes,
they do. I remember being more than a little taken back when I realized just how little
consideration we give to the art coming out of these “third world” nations. I admit, it
may be in part because their distributors do not focus on foreign markets like Hollywood
does. But I can’t help but think that it also has something to do with the way in which we
perceive the value of non-Western art. It cannot merely be the language barrier—we
have a rich market here for European independent and art house films. Even Japanese
auteurs like Akira Kurosawa—and in recent years, Hayao Miyazaki—have made a decent
name for themselves in the United States. But I’d argue that you have to dig a little
deeper to find people who know the names of Hou Hsiao-Hsien or Jia Zhangke. But
there’s no reason why those names shouldn’t be more familiar to the average, selfproclaimed cinephile.
Contemporary cinema, in my mind, is one of the most accessible forms of art.
From vendors selling pirated DVDs on the street to legal online streaming, we enjoy
unprecedented access to films made across the world—including the parts of the world
that are unfamiliar to us. I don’t know if even Fredric Jameson could have predicted the
sheer amount of information that we share with our global neighbors. So why don’t we
know about these films? Perhaps one might argue that we watch movies for
entertainment, and what’s better for entertainment than the stuff I can watch on Netflix?
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But of course, those Hollywood blockbusters that we see for fun don’t exist in an
apolitical, cultureless vacuum. Rather, they tap into our Americanness by reflecting a
unique cultural context that separates us from the rest of the world. In other words, we
speak the film’s language—both literally and metaphorically. In this manner, film is a
medium for communication, and therefore it represents and opportunity for learning.
When we watch a movie by Wong Kar-wai, it is difficult not to bring along all of our
ideological baggage and misconceived notions about China and Hong Kong. We might
immediately bring to mind the effects of colonialism, or the protests that swept across the
city within the past year. Jameson, in his discussion of national allegory, has a fair point
here. He knows that no matter what we tell ourselves, we will be watching these films
with tinted glasses. It would be difficult, if not altogether impossible, to wipe the slate
entirely clean when it comes to how we perceive the world around us. Regardless, as
I’ve said, there is something to be learned here. I, for one, have learned that Hong Kong,
Taiwan, and mainland China are different. Of course, that seems obvious. But over the
past few months I have come to understand how shared history and collective trauma can
forge national identity, and how the people of China have fought to express what it means
to be Chinese. But there are no easy answers here, I’m afraid. I cannot say exactly what
defines national identity in China, as it seems to change drastically depending on who
you ask. But isn’t that worth knowing in itself?
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